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Chapter 2 
Levy (1981), Caso-Raphael and Miranda (1984), and Gil Diaz (1984b). 
1.  Excellent accounts of the SD economic policies may be found in Solis (198 l), 
2.  Data on the consolidated public sector deficit prior to 1965 are not available. 
3.  Kaldor’s proposed tax reform is described in Kaldor (1964). 
4.  See Bueno (1971), Wallace (1980), and Wallace and ten Kate (1980). 
5. See Gregory (1986) for a detailed discussion of the various problems plaguing 
the census data. 
6.  Tello  (1979,  chap.  I),  Reynolds  (1970),  Solis  (1981,  7-8),  Levy  (1981, 
14-16),  Clavijo and Valdivieso (1983), Rizzo (1984, 101, 122), Aspe and Sigmund 
(1984), Newel1 and Rubio (1984). 
7.  See, for example, Tello (1979, ch.l), Solis (1981), Levy (1981, 15), Villareal 
(1983, 382, 386), and Aspe and Beristain (1984a, 23). 
8.  See Camancho (1977) or Solis (1981). 
9. Bueno  (1971),  Camancho  (1977),  Tello  (1979,  chap.  l), Levy  (1981,  14), 
Villareal (1983), and Looney (1985, chap. 2). 
10. See Fields (1980). 
11.  This figure is obtained by multiplying nominal GDP in 1958 and 1970 by the 
income share of the poorest 40 percent and then deflating by the period average CPI. 
12.  van Ginneken classified families  with incomes below  10,000 pesos  in  1970 
prices (close to the  1970 minimum wage) as living in poverty. 
13. The brief summary that follows is based on Gregory (1986, 151-66). 
14.  Allen Sangines performed the empirical estimation of the political expenditure 
15.  See, for example, Villareal (1983). 
16. The Durbin-Watson value fell in the indeterminant range.  Bartlett’s  test was 
17.  See World Bank (1979, 28-33)  and Solis (1981). 
18.  See Buffie (1987b, 1988) on the connection between capital accumulation and 
trade policy. In  Buffie (1987a) it is shown that in the presence of an economywide 
rigid real wage, an optimal, second-best trade policy frequently entails an escalated 
structure of  protection-cum-export  promotion.  When real  wage  rigidity  is  largely 
confined to  the  import-competing  industrial  sector,  as  in  Mexico  during  the  SD 
cycle for this study. 
again applied and did not turn up evidence of first-order serial correlation. 537  Mexico/Notes 
period, there is a strong presumption that optimal trade policy will be biased in favor 
of protection. 
19. See  note  12 for an explanation  of  how  the  increase  in  real  income  of  the 
poorest 40 percent is calculated. 
20.  This thesis is developed persuasively by Newell and Rubio (1984). 
Chapter 3 
1. A large number of other, less important measures were also proposed. See Solis 
2.  The possibility of a forced devaluation was especially feared. It was felt that if 
this  came  to  pass,  the  administration  would  suffer  a  complete  loss  of  political 
legitimacy (Whitehead 1980, 847). 
(1981, 42-43). 
3.  Excelsior (29 December  1972). 
4.  The  political  analysis  that  follows  is  based  on  Newell  and  Rubio  (1984, 
5.  The expansion  in the parastatal  sector cannot  be  attributed  mostly  to higher 
expenditures by PEMEX. Total real expenditures of the non-PEMEX parastatal sector 
increased at an annual average rate of 22.3 percent. 
6. Newell and Rubio (1987, 137) also make this observation, but nonetheless label 
Echevem‘a a populist. 
7.  Different estimates of capital flight are discussed in chapter 4. The figure in the 
text refers to the “Modified  Zedillo”  estimate adjusted by Gulati’s estimate of fake 
trade invoicing. The Morgan Guaranty definition of capital flight is used: the change 
in foreign debt plus net foreign direct investment plus the current surplus minus the 
change in reserves. 
120- 25). 
8.  See Whitehead (1980, 846) and Zedillo (1986, 969). 
9. The data in the  1975 Income-Expenditure Survey are not reliable.  Comparing 
the summary income distribution measures in table 2.11 for 1970 and 1977 suggests, 
if  anything,  that inequality increased.  (The first year of Lopez Portillo’s  term was 
1977, but the IMF stabilization program implemented in that year may be properly 
regarded  as a  legacy  of  the Echevem’a  administration.)  Note  also that  Atkinson’s 
Coefficient rises between  1969 and 1977 except for extremely small values of E (< 
0.5). 
Chapter 4 
1. These were the government guidelines for private sector wage increases. 
2.  Original plans to fully eliminate export subsidies (i.e., CEDIS) and institute an 
export  tax  to  absorb  excess profits  generated  by  the  1976 devaluation  were  not 
carried out. 
3.  The  goal  in  the  Fund  program  was  to  raise  the  share  of  private  sector 
investment in GNP by one percentage point. 
4.  The real import price here refers to a price index for total merchandise imports 
and is calculated by deflating by the period average GDP deflator. 
5.  The following account  for how  enhanced  oil wealth  altered Mexico’s policy 
course draws heavily on Zedillo’s (1985) superb survey. 
6.  I contend only that the slow growth in input prices helped stem the inflationary 
pressures created by the increase in government spending; I am not of the view that 538  Edward F.  Buffie 
inflation is predominantly a cost-side phenomenon in Mexico. There is considerable 
disagreement among Mexican  economists on this point.  Gil Diaz (1976),  Cavazos 
(1976), and Yacaman (1983) argue that inflation is driven mostly by excess demand. 
Clavijo (1980) and Ize and Salas (1985) seem to favor the “structuralist”  view that 
prices are set mostly by input costs, but their empirical results support the middling 
position that both input costs and excess demand influence the inflation rate. Ize and 
Salas  concede  that  demand  factors  have  “a  significant  role  in  explaining  price 
dynamics”  (198).  Clavijo  also  finds  that  both  cost  factors  and  excess  demand 
significantly affect inflation. 
7.  These wage indices may not accurately reflect movements in the after-tax real 
wage in 1980 and 1981. In the 1979 tax reform the exemption level was increased (to 
the minimum wage) and marginal tax rates for low income groups were lowered in an 
effort to offset the bracket creep caused by inflation. 
8. For  a detailed  analysis of the  1979 tax reform,  see Gil Diaz (1984a) and the 
account given by SHCP (1979) in El Trirnestre Economico. 
9. Expenditures  to cover  revenue  shortfalls in  four broad  areas account  for the 
bulk of  these transfers:  (1) the DIF, an institute  for aiding  the homeless  and poor 
children  (headed  by  Lopez  Portillo’s  wife);  (2)  the  National  University;  (3) 
unregistered  subsidiaries  of  CONASUPO;  and  (4)  chiquilleriu  (small  stuff),  a 
category  comprising  mostly  companies  in  which  the  government  has  a  minority 
interest,  educational  institutions  other  than  the  National  University,  and  local 
development centers. 
For reasons I do not fully understand,  Jorge Hierro was kind enough to take the 
better part of one month out of his life (shortly before getting married) to unravel this 
mystery. I am greatly indebted to him. 
10. The  reason  general  tax  revenues  frequently  exceed  total  revenues  of  the 
nonparastatal sector is that I classify tax payments by state-owned enterprises in table 
4.7 as revenues of the parastatal sector. 
11.  This  huge  increase  in  consumer  imports  implies  unbelievably  large  price 
and/or income  elasticities  of  demand.  Apparently,  much of  the  increased demand 
reflected  strong  intertemporal  substitution  as  the  public  speculated  that  the  real 
exchange rate appreciation and trade liberalization would soon be reversed.  On the 
relation between policy credibility and intertemporal  substitution,  see Calvo (1986, 
1987). 
12.  It is doubtful that the slowdown in growth  in  the OECD countries after the 
second oil shock contributed significantly to the decline in nonoil exports. Mexico’s 
share in OECD nonoil imports has always been very small. Even when oil exports 
are included, the Mexican share declined 15 percent between 1961-65  and 1976-78 
(Clavijo and Valdivieso 1983, 905). 
13. All of the definitions in table 4.12 employ the Morgan Guaranty definition of 
capital flight. Cuddington (1986) has pointed out that the Morgan Guaranty definition 
treats  “normal”  capital  flows  (foreign  assets  acquired  for  purposes  of  ordinary 
business activity, for portfolio diversification, etc .) as capital flight. Given that our 
interest is in how the net foreign debt evolved, this is the appropriate definition of 
capital  flight.  For  estimates that  attempt  to  distinguish  between  flight  capital  (or 
speculative capital flows) and normal capital flows and a discussion of the conceptual 
difficulties this entails, see Cuddington (1986) and Cumby and Levich (1987). 539  Mexico/Notes 
The data bases differ in several other ways besides those discussed in the text. For 
reasons that are not clear, the IMF data used by Cumby and Levich on the current 
account deficit and the change in reserves differ a great deal from the Bank of Mexico 
data as reported in Indicadores Economicos. 
14. The  extent  to  which  capital  flight  estimates  should  be  adjusted  for  dis- 
crepancies between home and partner  country  data is open to dispute.  Partner and 
home country data may differ for reasons unrelated to illegal trade. (See Cumby and 
Levich 1987 on this point.) 
15.  The  debt  data  in  this  paragraph  is taken  from Mexican Economic Outlook 
(CIEMEX-WHARTON),  various  issues.  Data  on  the  short-term  debt  is  of  poor 
quality, particularly for the private sector. 
16. The figures for the ratios of debt and debt service to GDP do not contain a 
correction  for departures of  the  real  exchange  rate  from  its  long-run  equilibrium 
value. As  the peso was heavily overvalued between  1979 and  1981, the figures for 
these years are undoubtedly underestimates of the true values. 
17. These are the figures for debt service  implied by  adherence  to the existing 
repayments  schedule.  In  the  last  four  months  of  1982,  Mexico  suspended  all 
payments on the private  sector debt and most payments on principal  of  the public 
sector  debt.  The  suspension  of  debt  service  appears  in  the  Mexican  balance  of 
payments  accounts with a positive  sign under the category  ingreso virtual (virtual 
income)  and  a  matching  negative  sign  under  the  category  egreso virtual  (virtual 
expenditures). 
18.  Another factor that probably contributed to fiscal indiscipline at this time was 
the  sway  held  by  the  Cambridge  Group  in  policy  circles.  The Cambridge  Group 
argued that the economy  was not overheated by  excess aggregate demand in  1980 
and  1981. See Eatwell and Singh (1981) and Looney (1985, 173-77). 
19. One possible explanation for the large increase in short-term  lending can be 
found  in  Krugman  (1985).  Defensive  lending  may  be  rational  if  it  lowers  the 
probability  of  default.  The  expected  loss  on  new lending  must  then  be balanced 
against the gain for averting default and avoiding losses on previous lending. Clearly, 
however, there is a free rider problem in that it is in the interest of each individual 
bank  to let  other  banks  extend  the  new  loans  that  protect  old  loans.  Krugman 
suggests  that  this  may  lead  to  excessive  short-term  lending  in  crisis  periods. 
Individual lenders who can free ride may prefer to lend short term so that they can 
get out quickly before default actually occurs. 
20.  This  account  of  the  swings in policy  in the  first half  of  1982 is based  on 
Zedillo (1985) and Looney (1985). 
21.  For ease of  comparison, both the expenditure  figures and PEMEX revenues 
are deflated by the period average CPI. 
22.  Perceived  political  risk  must  have been  the  major  factor  provoking  capital 
flight since Mexdollars were available as a hedge against exchange risk. See Ize and 
Ortiz (1983) on this  point and for an interesting  model  incorporating endogenous 
political risk. Their analysis suggests that political risk was an important factor in the 
“overdevaluation”  of the peso in  1982. 
23.  There  is  disagreement  on  the  role  that  Mexdollar  accounts  played  in 
precipitating the 1982 crisis. Taylor (1983) contends that the lack of foreign exchange 
reserves  to  cover  portfolio  shifts  out  of  Mexdollars  made  the  financial  system 540  Edward F.  Buffie 
exceedingly  vulnerable  to  speculative  flows.  On  the  other  hand,  as  Ortiz (1983) 
observes,  financial  stability  prevailed  throughout  the  late  fifties  and  sixties  when 
dollarization  was  greater  than  during  1981 or  1982.  What  matters  for  financial 
stability is that investors view Mexdollars as being safe. 
24.  Connolly  and  Taylor  (1984)  and  Blanco  and  Garber  (1986)  develop  and 
estimate  models of  the  speculative  attacks  that  brought  about  the  collapse  of  the 
exchange rate in August 1982. 
25.  Notas Sobre la Reestructuracion  de la Deuda Externa de Mexico  (n.d.,  11, 
table 1) [internal document produced by SHCP]. 
26.  For a Balassa-type decomposition of the relative contributions of internal and 
external shocks to debt accumulation during this period, see Solis and Zedillo (1985) 
and Zedillo (1986). It is clear from table 5 in Zedillo (1986, 971) that if  the item 
reflecting  expansion  of  oil  exports  at  constant  terms  of  trade  is  classified  as  an 
external factor rather than a “domestic  policy action,”  then the aggregate effect of 
external shocks during the Lopez Portillo administration was strongly favorable to 
Mexico. 
27.  This conclusion is supported by  the empirical  findings of Hill (1984) which 
are  based  on  the  data  generated  by  the  1977 Income-Expenditure  Survey.  If  the 
percentage of  total  taxes  paid  by  each  decile  is taken  as a proxy  for its  share of 
financing the subsidies, the subsidies to electricity and home heating fuel redistribute 
income  from  the  top  two  to  the  bottom  eight  deciles,  with  the  middle  deciles 
benefitting most in absolute terms. The redistributive impact of low cost public sector 
transportation is similar. In the case of gas consumption, the redistribution is from the 
top decile and the bottom four deciles (whose consumption is negligible) to the fifth 
through the ninth deciles. 
The middle and upper-middle classes also enjoy most of the benefits conferred by 
CONASUPO subsidies. Consumption at CONASUPO stores peaks at the seventh decile. 
The  net  gains  for  the  bottom  two  deciles  are  miniscule.  Solis  (1984)  investigates 
CONASUPO operations in greater detail and arrives at the same conclusion. 
Chapter 5 
1. The private sector import volume is calculated by  multiplying the total import 
volume by the ratio of the dollar value of private sector imports to the dollar value of 
total imports. 
2.  Some data on the extremely sharp reduction in profit rates is available from the 
balance sheets and income statements of  1,300 industrial companies in which some 
form  of  foreign  investment  exists.  According  to  calculations  by  a  World  Bank 
mission, in 1980 and 1981 the real pretax return on equity for the industrial sector as 
a whole was approximately 10 percent.  In  1982 the return dropped to -  30 percent 
and  in  1983 it  stood  at  -20  percent  (World Bank  1986, 94-95).  The operating 
return (revenues minus operating costs divided by total assets) was 6 percent in 1980, 
-4  percent in 1982, and zero in 1983 (96). 
3.  Deflating the dollar value of public sector imports by Informe Anual’s index of 
dollar import prices (Informe And  1985, 201) gives an increase in real public sector 
imports of only 8 percent in 1984. 
4.  The following account of  the Fund program is based on the Letter of  Intent, 
which  has  been  published  in  El  Trimestre  Economico,  52  (July-September 
1985):865-73. 541  Mexico/Notes 
5.  For a detailed description of the trade liberalization program, see Informe And 
1986 (115-17) and World Bank (1986, 15-18).  In April  1985, the number of tariff 
rates were reduced from ten  to seven and the range of  rates compressed to  10-50 
percent.  In  July,  tariffs replaced  licenses  for  a  large  number  of  imports.  Import 
liberalization was also extended to encompass competitive intermediate inputs. Prior 
to 1985, import liberalization had applied only to noncompetitive intermediate inputs 
and  capital  goods.  Under  the  new  policy  regime,  import  licenses  are  to  be 
automatically  granted  whenever  the  price  of  a domestically  produced  intermediate 
input exceeds the international price by more than 50 percent. There is some question 
about  the  true  extent  of  import  liberalization.  Some  industries  are  placed  in 
“special”  categories that exempt them from liberalization.  In other cases, domestic 
content  requirements  and  the  levying  of  tariffs  on  “reference  prices”  result  in 
domestic prices that far exceed world market prices. 
On the export side, the two main promotional measures were preferential access to 
imports  and  “indirect  export  promotion.”  Starting  in  1985,  export  firms  were 
entitled to import as much as 40 percent of their export earnings, with intermediate 
inputs entering duty free. Indirect export promotion provides for a temporary increase 
in imports of domestic firms producing important intermediate inputs utilized by the 
export sector. 
6. Further  steps were taken  in  1987. At  present  (early  1988), there  is a  nearly 
uniform tariff rate of 20 percent and virtually  all quantitative restrictions have been 
eliminated. 
7.  The planned privatization of  236 SOEs will not be of  much help in this regard. 
A  few  SOEs  account  for  the  great  majority  of  expenditures  undertaken  by  the 
parastatal sector. 
8. High  nominal  interest rates  have been  an  important  factor  in  the  decline  of 
income from the corporate profits tax  (Informe Anual 1985, 30). Interest payments 
are subtracted from total gross profits when computing taxable profits. The tax law 
does not take account of the fact that under  high inflation a large fraction of  total 
interest payments are offset by reduction in the real value of firm debts. 
9. Some  would  argue  that  capital  gains  or  losses  on  the  external  and  dollar- 
indexed  internal  debt  owing  to  variations  in  the  real  exchange  rate  should  be 
included. But in steady-state equilibrium, the real exchange rate is constant. Hence, 
if the aim is to obtain a measure of the size of the deficit not associated with inertial 
inflation,  interest payments  on external  and dollar-indexed  debt  should be  ignored 
altogether. 
10.  The estimates of the actual and inflation-adjusted deficits by the Central Bank 
and SHCP differ by more than one percentage point of GDP in some years, and there 
are  questions  about  the  accuracy  of  the  reported  figures.  It  is  not  clear  how  the 
FICORCA  subsidies  (see  sec.  8.3 below  for  details  of  FICORCA  program)  are 
accounted for in the reported deficit. In addition, it seems that double counting is a 
problem.  Apparently, foreign loans contracted by NAFINSA (the principal develop- 
ment bank) and re-lent in pesos are counted twice, as part of  external and internal 
debt of the public sector. (See Perez 1986, 17.) 
11. I  ignore  here  capital  gains  and  losses  on  assets  other  than  money  and 
government bonds. 
12. In general, one would expect the IAD to vary with the inflation rate (either 
through a Tanzi effect upon real tax revenues or a change in the real interest rate), but 542  Edward F.  Buffie 
neither the sign of the relation nor its quantitative significance are clear. The Central 
Bank has  made  some  crude guesstimates  of  the  size of  the  Tanzi effect  (Informe 
Anual 1986, 184-86).  At the inflation rates Mexico is experiencing, the Tanzi effect 
seems to be  very small. 
13. Savings might also decline because the public harbors doubts about how long 
anti-inflationary  policies  will  be  kept  in  place  (see  Calvo  1386).  Greater  fiscal 
austerity (i.e., an inflation-adjusted surplus) may then be necessary for a period in 
order to restore the government’s reputation. 
14. Published  figures overstate  the  true  decrease  in  the  real  monetary  base  in 
1985. Much of  the decrease reflected an administrative  sleight of  hand.  In January 
1985, the legal reserve ratio was lowered from 48 to  10 percent.  (For commercial 
banks,  the  10 percent rate applied to deposits exceeding the December  1984 level, 
while for the government development banks (La Banca de Desarrollo) it applied to 
deposit balances above the highest balance registered  in  1984.) At the  same time, 
however,  all banks  were  required  to use  35 percent  of  their  deposits  to  purchase 
federal government debt instruments, and the commercial banks were also required to 
place 3 percent of  the funds at the disposal of the government  development banks 
(Informe Anual 1985, 119-20).  In effect, a large part of bank reserves were simply 
reclassified as government debt. 
15. Loans  for  low-income  housing,  agricultural  development,  and  export 
promotion were exempted from the credit squeeze. 
16. These real import figures are calculated by deflating dollar import aggregates 
by the dollar price index for total imports found in lnforme Anual 1985 (201). 
17. Ize and Ortiz (1985) argue that the continuation of capital flight was due in 
large part to ongoing fiscal weakness. The perceived inability of the government to 
service  its  internal  debt  raised  fears  that  a  de facto default  would  be  engineered 
through a large devaluation that would strongly increase the price level. 
18. For detailed descriptions of the debt restructuring,  see Informe Anual 1986, 
Gunia Trevirio (1987), and Heath (1987). 
19. Many of the poor in the agricultural and urban informal sectors are paid less 
than  the  minimum  wage,  but  there  is  not  much  doubt  that  the  worsening  in 
underemployment has strongly depressed real wages of these groups. Furthermore, 
adjusting real wages for the high  inflation tax  since  1981 would probably  show a 
relatively larger decline in the real incomes of  the poorest groups. Gonzales (1983) 
analyzes the  likely  incidence  of  the  inflation tax  using  data  gathered  in the  1977 
Income-Expenditure Survey. The poorest four deciles hold almost all of their wealth 
in the form of cash. The very poor also hold a substantial amount of  debt with stores 
and the enterprises that employ them. Even if the nominal interest rate on such debt is 
assumed to remain constant as inflation increases, the inflation tax lowers real income 
of the second, third, and fourth poorest deciles. 
20.  It is extremely unfortunate that Mexican borrowing has turned out, perversely, 
to be pro-shock, not counter-shock as consumption smoothing would dictate. Almost 
$60 billion of  debt was taken out between  1977 and  1982 when the terms of  trade 
were favorable (perhaps high oil prices were viewed as permanent). In the post-1982 
period,  the  terms  of  trade  have  hit  an  historical  low  and  bank  lending  has  been 
sharply  curtailed.  Gersovitz  (1985)  has  observed  that  the  pro-shock  patterns  of 
borrowing is not atypical. 543  MexicoINotes 
21.  CEDIS fell  from  11 percent  of  manufacturing  exports  in  1979 to  only  0.3 
percent in  1985 (World Bank  1986). Since  1983, the FOMEX (fidecomiso para el 
Foment0 de Exportaciones) interest rate subsidy has decreased steadily and, under the 
1985 U.S.-Mexico  trade  accord,  is supposed to be  fully eliminated  by  the  end of 
1987. 
Chapter 6 
1.  Almost all imports were subject to quantitative restrictions from 1982 to 1984. 
In  July  1985,  controls  were  greatly  eased,  but  largely  for  capital  goods  and 
intermediate inputs.  In  1986, 68 percent of  nondurable consumer goods production 
and  98  percent of  consumer  durables  production  were  still  protected  by  nontariff 
barriers  to  trade  (World  Bank  1986,  20).  Even  with  complete  liberalization  of 
consumer imports it would probably still be appropriate,  for analytical purposes,  to 
treat manufactures as part of the nontradables sector (i.e., the sector where prices are 
endogenously determined).  Manufactured  goods, unlike primary goods, tend to be 
heterogeneous so that domestic and foreign products are seldom perfect substitutes. 
2.  This  data  comes  from  the  1977  Income-Expenditure  Survey.  See Gallardo 
(1983), tables 3 (2230) and 8 (2242). In an extensive study, Levy (1980) argues that 
underemployment,  not  open unemployment,  is the major problem  in  the  Mexican 
labor market. 
3.  Kolbeck (1983) argues that this dualistic labor market specification is especially 
relevant for Mexico. 
4. When L"  increases, 02 is replaced by 8f(l - $) in (17), where 4 = w"/w". 
5. The  conclusion  here  that  devaluation  is  contractionary  is  based  on  adverse 
supply-side effects.  Devaluation may  be  demand  contractionary  as well  (Krugman 
and  Taylor  1978), but  this  possibility  does not alter the  results  qualitatively.  Any 
nominal devaluation that produces a real devaluation will lower employment in the 
high-wage manufacturing sector. 
Devaluation may also prove contractionary by raising the real supply price of capital 
goods  and depressing  investment  spending.  The ensuing  capital  decumulation  can 
then  give  rise  to  a  lengthy  period  of  falling  output,  high  unemployment,  and 
declining real wages (Buffie 1986). 
6. A  reduction  in  15"  is  sufficient  to  lower  real  income  in  the  present  model 
because wx < W" and export sector employment cannot expand by  an amount more 
than nontradables sector employment contracts when there is no open unemployment 
initially. If open unemployment does exist initially, L"  can increase to a greater extent 
and devaluation could be expansionary. When the source of open unemployment is an 
economywide rigid real wage, the outcome turns on whether labor demand expands 
more  in  the export  sector than  it contracts  in  the  nontradables  sector. There is a 
presumption, however, that aggregate employment will decline when the devaluation 
is undertaken to eliminate an initial trade balance deficit. See Buffie (1987b) for an 
analysis of this case. 
7.  It  has  been  assumed  that  all  consumer  imports  are  banned.  If  there  is  an 
import-competing sector protected by  a tariff, an increase in v should be interpreted 
as a proportionate increase in the export subsidy and the tariff on consumer imports. 
8.  When  L"  increases,  p is  set  equal  to  unity  in  the  expression  for  Al. The 
assumption that v  = 0 initially means that a small increase in the subsidy does not 544  Edward F.  Buffie 
create  any  byproduct  distortions.  Once  v  ceases  to  be  infinitesimally  small,  the 
byproduct  distortions  tend  to  lower  income  and  further  increases  in  the  export 
subsidy become less effective. 
9. This  proposition  holds  only  when  the  export  subsidy  and  implicit  tariff  on 
imported  intermediates  are  initially  zero.  Also,  an  export  subsidy  may  exert  a 
generally  less adverse effect  on employment  even  if  (33) fails to hold,  because  a 
subsidy is more effective  in stimulating  labor demand  in  the  export  sector than  a 
devaluation.  Thus it is possible for L"  to decline more but open unemployment to 
increase less under an export subsidy than under a devaluation. 
10.  A comparison of the impact on P, (and hence the general price level) does not 
yield firm  conclusions.  Nontradables supply expands more under an export subsidy 
because  the  price  of  imported  inputs  remains  constant.  If  L"  declines,  P,  may 
nonetheless  rise  more  than  under  a  comparable  devaluation,  because  the  greater 
increase in export sector employment causes nontradables demand to increase more 
strongly. However, P, always rises less under an  export subsidy when the subsidy 
succeeds in increasing L"  (drawing labor out of the export sector). 
11. That is, the nominal money supply deflated by P,y"P,y',  the CPI, increases in 
the  case  of  an  export  subsidy  but  remains  unchanged  under  a  devaluation.  The 
Metzlerian savings function is responsible for this result-real  wealth moves in the 
same direction as real income across steady states. 
12.  It  is  also  assumed  that  the  appropriate  price  deflator  for  government 
expenditures is the CPI (P,y"Pp).  If this is not the case, an additional terms appears in 
(35) that picks up the effect of a change in relative prices on the fiscal deficit. 
13. This, of course, entails solving for L"  in a different model with some specific 
assumptions about the form of government expenditures. For example, if  government 
expenditures are for a mixture of wage payments, consumption of  nontradables, the 
imports, then (8) and (10") are replaced by 
(9')  D"(.)  + G"  = p 
(  10"')  Y  = (1 -  z)[R(.) + WGY], 
where G"  is fixed government consumption of  domestic manufactures; wg is the 
public sector wage (indexed to the CPI); and Lg is the fixed level of public sector 
employment. The general solution for L"  in this model supports the claim made in 
the text. 
Chapter 7 
1. For a given  set of  relative  goods  prices  and a given value  of  w"',  the  three 
zero-profit conditions determine the capital rental, the land rental, and wx. 
2.  If  capital  is  used  in  producing  one  or  both  of  the  agricultural  goods  W 
increases with the aggregate capital stock under the assumption that the manufactur- 
ing sector is relatively capital intensive. 
3. This syndrome of "financial  repression"  is extensively discussed in McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973). 
4.  See Gonzalez (1983). 
5. In a model focussing on steady states where expectations are correct and risk is 
absent, it is difficult to explain why  individuals would permanently hold a foreign- 545  Mexico/Notes 
currency-denominated  asset.  Therefore,  I will  not  address  the  important  issue  of 
capital flight. 
6. To  ensure a positive demand for deposits, I also assume lim V, = m.  Similar 
assumptions are made to guarantee that landowners and workers hold positive money 
balances (for workers, money holdings include both deposits and currency). 
7. This assumption is also employed by Nairay 1984). It is helpful in tying down 
certain comparative statics results. 
8. Real debt service varies with the real exchange rate, but in our small, totally 
open economy the real exchange rate is fixed, and hence it is legitimate to treat S  as 
exogenous. 
9. I ignore the Tanzi effect, the tendency for real tax revenues to decline when 
inflation accelerates. It is not clear that the Tanzi effect operates with much force in 
Mexico. In 1986, when oil prices collapsed and the inflation rate surged from 63.7 to 
105 percent, the Mexican government managed to raise the share of nonoil revenues 
in GDP by 3.6 percentage points. 
10.  Viewed  from  another  angle,  the  potential  base  for  the  inflation  tax  is 
C  + (D -  Lj, currency plus net loans from the private to the public sector through 
the banking system. If r, and r, are kept fixed, (D -  L) is shielded from the inflation 
tax, so increases in a tax only C. 
11.  The net impact on the adjusted fiscal deficit is positive only when the deficit 
on financial intermediation is initially zero or not too large. If there is an initial deficit 
of  akD (implying that r,x  + rbkb -  rr,  = 0 initially),  increases in D  do not alter 
the adjusted fiscal deficit. And if the initial deficit exceeds akD,  the adjusted deficit 
worsens as D  increases. 
12. I have not said anything about the current account deficit. It can be confirmed, 
however, by  aggregating over the private and public sector budget constraints,  that 
the current account deficit is zero in steady-state equilibrium. 
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13. Note thatf:  + kbD3 = fi  + k&  > 0 sincef:  > -hy. 
14. If the real deposit rate is negative,  p,  and cid should be interpreted as interest 
semi-elasticities of demand (i.e., p,,  -  DJD and a, - (aB"/ar,)/B"). 
15. The direct effect may be inflationary when  government revenues depend on 
the supply of effective labor and, as in efficiency wage models, the effort exerted by 
government employees is a positive function of the real wage. This interesting idea is 
developed in O'Connell (1987). 
16. Ize 1984, 20, 22) also argues that higher taxes are not an adequate substitute 
for cuts in government current expenditures in adjusting to increased debt service. 
17. Obviously,  I  am ignoring  here  intertemporal  considerations,  which  suggest 
that it will be desirable to smooth out adjustment to the shock (by cutting capital as 
well  as current  expenditures), and the  possibility  that government  consumption  is 
socially more valuable than private consumption. Political economy considerations 
may  also  weaken  this  conclusion.  As  Ize  (1984) has  observed,  if  social  tension 
increases when government social welfare expenditures are cut, domestic investment 
may decline (at least in the short run) while political risks are perceived to be high. 
18. A decrease in M is quite improbably if  bonds and deposits are complements. 
19. See Morley  and Fishlow  (1987) for an interesting  analysis of  the dynamic 
stability problems that arise from the interaction of high real interest rates and high 
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20. The figures refer to end-of-year stocks deflated by  the end-of-year CPI. The 
decrease  in  the  real  monetary  base  is  calculated  by  adjusting  for  the  changes 
introduced in  the January  1895 banking law (Ley Organica del Banco de Mexico), 
which substituted mandatory purchases  of government debt for a large part  of  the 
reserve  requirement  (see chap.  5, n. 14). According  to the published  figures,  the 
decrease in the real monetary base between  1982 and 1986 was 56.4 percent. 
21. The profit function corresponding to the following production function 
Q = a&J  + a,/J + NaK('  ~  a) 
(where a,,  a,, and a. are constants) has the properties  that +,+,,  = +KK = 0 and 
+KJ > 0. And +,  = aQ/aJ = 0 evaluated at J = d- 
22.  The impact on capitalist deposit demand is ambiguous because of conflicting 
income and substitution effects.  It is assumed in figure 7.8 that D'  does not change 
following the decrease in J. 
23.  Subsequent  events have borne  out  this  conjecture.  On  16  December  1987, 
with inflation running at an annual rate of over 200 percent, President De la Madrid 
instituted  a  system  of  partial  wage-price  controls  (the  Solidarity  Economic  Pact). 
Despite  low  rates  of  growth  of  controlled  prices  and  the  application  of  severely 
contractionary fiscal and monetary policy, free prices continued to increase strongly 
through the first half of  1988. 
Chapter 8 
Presupuesto). 
1. Avances del Plan  Global de Desarrollo,  1891  (Secretm'a  de Programacion  y 
2. The SICARTSA case has been analyzed in great detail by Wellons (1987). 
3.  The  1982  crisis  was  foreseen  in  early  1981  by  many  Mexican  (and 
non-Mexican) economists. See, for example, Levy (1981, chap. 5). 
4. See Kraft (1984) for a fascinating chronicle of this period.  An excellent, very 
detailed account of the debt negotiations since 1982 may be found in Gurria Treviiio 
(1987). 
5. Measures were also taken in 1983 to regularize payments on the private sector 
debt. Arrangements were made for payment of over $800 million to foreign suppliers 
and payment of  $900  million of interest arrears accumulated on commercial bank debt. 
6. Calculated as net  interest payments  (interest on the private  and public  sector 
foreign debt plus remitted profits less income from Mexican investments abroad) less 
the net increase in external indebtedness (inclusive of net foreign direct investment 
but exclusive of  the net changes in international reserves).  For reasons discussed in 
chapter  4, Zedillo's  figures  (1986, 177) are  used  for  the  net  increase  in  external 
indebtedness.  When capital flight and reserve accumulation are factored in, the net 
transfer made by  Mexico is considerably larger. 
7. This account of the 1984 negotiations is from Zedillo (1986, 981). 
8. The Baker Plan, announced in October 1985, proposed that fifteen countries be 
granted $29 billion of new loans from the World Bank  and private commercial banks, 
under the condition that the countries introduce market-oriented policies. 
9.  The Paris Club agreement  was  made conditional  on the  success of  the  IMF 
standby, thus adding yet another cross-conditionality clause to the 1986 restructuring 
package. 547  MexicoJReferences 
Chapter 9 
1. In fact, on 16 December 1987, Mexico sought relief from inflationary pressures 
by  implementing  a  system  of  partial  wage-price  controls.  The  controls  cover the 
exchange  rate,  all  public  sector  prices,  wages,  and  the  prices  of  certain  key 
consumption goods. Other prices are free to adjust. 
2.  Other types of tax increases may help control inflation without jeopardizing growth. 
In the model of chapter 7, for example, it is easy to show that a land tax will lower the 
inflation rate while leaving the  steady-state capital stock and  real output unchanged. 
Whether it is politically feasible to introduce such selective taxes is another matter. 
3.  There are  numerous  types  of  monetary  policy.  The  statement  in  the  text  is 
correct  for  decreases  in  the  reserve  requirement  and  increases  in real  lending  by 
development  banks.  A  decrease  in  required  bank  purchase  of  government  bonds 
raises real output and definitely reduces inflation if  accompanied by  a reduction in 
bond supply that stabilizes the real bond rate. 
4. I am at a complete loss to explain why, with $15 billion of foreign exchange 
reserves in 1987, the administration does not pursue more expansionary policies. 
5. This  policy,  of  course,  was  suspended  with  the  introduction  of  partial 
wage-price controls at the end of 1987. After the peso was devalued on 14 December 
1987, the controlled exchange rate was kept fixed for over a month and then adjusted 
gradually to a rate of 2,273 pesos. In March 1988 it was decided that the controlled 
rate would remain fixed at 2,273 pesos through the end of May.  Since free prices 
continued  to rise  at  a  rapid  rate  (6.9 percent  in  March),  the  real  exchange  rate 
appreciated considerably in the first quarter of  1988. 
6.  See Buffie (1987a,  1987c, 1988). 
7. See Sachs (1987). 
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